Over the past quarter-century, BRICS has evolved from an investment concept built around four fast-growing economies into one of the largest economic groupings in the world. The bloc now has 11 full members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, Iran, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Together, they account for close to 40% of the global economy measured at purchasing power parity and represent almost half of the world’s population. The central question is therefore no longer whether BRICS has sufficient economic scale to influence global markets. It is whether a group this large, diverse and politically heterogeneous can translate its combined economic weight into practical cooperation and lasting institutional influence.
Economic Integration Is Advancing Faster Than Political Unity
Trade demonstrates why BRICS cannot be treated as a purely political project. Intra-BRICS merchandise exports increased from approximately $84 billion in 2003 to $1.17 trillion in 2024, expanding more than thirteenfold. The bloc’s role in global trade has also increased substantially, while several members have become increasingly dependent on other BRICS economies as export destinations, import sources or suppliers of energy and industrial inputs. Brazil, Russia and Indonesia already direct more than 30% of their merchandise exports to BRICS markets, while several members source more than 40% of their imports from within the grouping. These figures suggest that the economic foundations of BRICS cooperation are becoming deeper even when agreement on geopolitical questions remains difficult.
The same pattern is visible in development finance. The New Development Bank, established in 2015 as a BRICS-backed multilateral institution, had approved around $44 billion in financing across more than 140 projects by mid-2026. Its scale remains modest compared with the World Bank and other established development institutions, but its significance lies elsewhere. It gives emerging economies an additional financing channel, creates opportunities for local-currency funding and demonstrates that BRICS members are capable of building institutions that operate alongside the traditional global financial architecture.
Payments May Change Before the Dollar Does
Discussions about de-dollarisation often attract more attention than the practical changes taking place underneath them. A single BRICS currency remains highly unlikely in the near term because the members have very different monetary systems, capital controls, trade structures and geopolitical objectives. India, in particular, has consistently taken a more cautious approach than countries advocating a faster reduction in dollar dependence. The more realistic development is therefore gradual: wider use of national currencies, stronger links between domestic payment systems, improved cross-border settlement infrastructure and additional financing channels outside conventional dollar-based mechanisms.
The September 2026 New Delhi summit reinforced this pragmatic direction. BRICS leaders supported stronger cross-border payment systems and greater use of local currencies while placing considerable emphasis on trade, development, supply-chain resilience, technology and economic cooperation. This is important for businesses because global financial change rarely happens through one dramatic replacement of an existing system. It usually develops through overlapping alternatives that become commercially relevant in particular markets, industries and transactions.
China Is Both the Bloc’s Engine and Its Central Strategic Challenge
China remains the largest economic force inside BRICS and a major driver of its trade flows. This gives Beijing considerable influence, but it also creates one of the bloc’s fundamental tensions. India, Brazil, the UAE and several other members see BRICS primarily as a mechanism for increasing strategic flexibility and improving representation of emerging economies. They are far less interested in replacing a Western-dominated order with one dominated by China.
The relationship between India and China illustrates this balancing act. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s September 2026 visit to New Delhi was his first visit to India in almost seven years, and both governments have recently taken steps toward stabilising bilateral relations. Yet competition in manufacturing, investment, technology and regional influence continues. Similar differences exist elsewhere in the bloc. Iran and the Gulf states have distinct regional priorities, Russia has redirected significant trade toward Global South markets under sanctions pressure, while countries such as India, Brazil and the UAE continue to maintain extensive commercial ties with the United States and Europe. Expansion therefore increases BRICS’ economic reach while simultaneously making consensus more difficult.
What BRICS Means for Business
For companies, the practical implications are more important than debates about whether BRICS can become a new G7. Greater South-South trade means businesses increasingly need to understand BRICS markets as interconnected production, sourcing and logistics networks rather than as isolated national opportunities. Local-currency settlement mechanisms could gradually create additional options for international transactions. At the same time, regulatory conditions remain highly fragmented, meaning that operating in China, India, Brazil, Indonesia or the UAE still requires very different market-entry, compliance and supply-chain strategies.
This also increases the value of geopolitical and supply-chain risk monitoring. Platforms such as Everstream Analytics illustrate how companies are responding to this environment by combining supplier mapping, event monitoring, risk assessment and predictive analytics. Sanctions, trade restrictions, transport disruptions or political tensions can increasingly affect suppliers several tiers below a company’s direct counterparties. Understanding these connections is becoming essential for procurement, manufacturing and logistics planning.
BRICS does not need to become politically homogeneous to matter. Its influence is more likely to emerge through hundreds of incremental changes in trade, investment, development finance, payment infrastructure and supply chains. For business leaders, that makes the bloc less a geopolitical slogan than an evolving economic network. The companies that monitor those changes at operational level will be better positioned to identify opportunities, manage exposure and adapt as the economic influence of the Global South continues to expand.